My promised piece of Assam is
taking some time as my source in Guwahati is still reconfirming some facts but
here I am sharing a real time anecdote that explains how an alliance can
suddenly turn into a dalliance and how micromanagement at the ground level can
save embarrassment in such a tricky situation. This is about 2010 assembly
election in Bihar…
My home constituency Jandaha was
dissolved during the delimitation. It was now part of Mahnar constituency
Sitting MLAs of both Mahnar and Jandaha were LJP men. Jandaha was a JD-U seat and Mahnar was a BJP
seat. Now after delimitation Mahnar was allocated to BJP. Jandaha MLA
(Achutanand Singh) was left in lurch as Mahnar MLA (Rama Singh) was more likely
to get nomination from LJP. BJP was also in a dire situation as its local
candidate in Mahnar had failed to gain any foothold in the past few elections
and a change of candidate was required. So Achutanand shifted side and joined
LJP and thus got nominated. On the other side of divide the RJD-LJP alliance
was also severally affected. Jandaha was a RJD seat and Mahnar was LJP seat.
Since both parties were in alliance this time, RJD conceded Mahnar seat to LJP.
Thus RJD candidates of both Jandaha and Mahnar found themselves out of loop. As
election days came closer rebellion started brewing on both side of divides.
The previous RJD candidate from Jandaha Umesh Singh Kushwaha (now a JD-U leader
and a close associate of Upendra Kushwaha) jumped into fray and threatened to
take away Kurmi-Koeri vote from the official NDA nominee. Repeated plea to JD-U
leaders failed to clear this hurdle. The talking heads of BJP went into huddle.
The old RJD candidate Mushi Lal Rai (a respected but aged Yadav leader) was
persuaded to file his nomination from Mahnar. Now the ruptures appeared in the
RJD-LJP alliance too as RJD supporters refused to back Rama Singh (a local
Rajput strongman). Now the stakes were even. The BJP candidate was solidly
backed by upper caste votes (barring a section of Rajput votes behind the LJP
candidate) and core BJP voters, LJP candidate was banking on his caste based
support and Paswan votes, JD-U rebel had good going with the traditional JD-U
voters and rebel RJD candidate had Yadavs backing him solidly. Muslim vote was
divided among all non-BJP candidates. All alliances were present on paper but
on ground none were working. Now what was the final outcome? Hold your breath
because this is going to give you a ringside view of what is going to happen in
many constituencies in Bihar in 2014. The BJP candidate won with a tiny amount
of votes 29754 votes out of total 118972 valid votes. The LJP candidate got
27265 votes. The winning margin was 2489 votes. And what the rebels got is
truly awesome. The RJD rebel got 20757 votes while the JD-U rebel got 18322
votes. Had it not been the micromanagement done by local BJP unit, LJP would
have carried the day hands down. Yet we all thought that 2010 Bihar assembly
election was won by a solid NDA alliance and development plank of the Nitish
administration. I was in Delhi when results were announced and all the TV
channels were interpreting the results in their own way. But having the ground
level experience I was only smiling at their wisdom. This story is not an
isolated event. It took place in several dozen constituencies and in some way
the swiftness of break-up in BJP-JD (U) alliance and RJD-LJP alliance traces
their origin from several such tales. Alliances may be switched up by the top
leadership yet unless the local units gel together they are more liability than
an asset and I can sense a similar kind of uneasiness in RJD-Congress alliance
where the traditional RJD voters are not ready to vote for INC. RVP has learnt
his lessons, RaGa is expected to learn it in hard way post May 16, 2014.
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