How reliable are Opinion polls?

Just as the first phase of E2014 gets closer a slew of surveys/opinion polls are bound to flood the TV channels.  Just like all the props associated with our democratic system even the Psehphology and Opinion Polls have been on target of several parties in India. The ruling party of India has been so peeved by them that they have boycotted the shows centered around these polls. Yet by keeping our eyes shut we cannot run away the fact. In all large democracies the Opinion Polls are an integral part of the democratic process and by banning them we can only harm their evolution. However at this point of time there are several myths that need to be busted about these polls.

Myth No. 1 ;- These polls are unreliable

Reality :- This may have been a case till a few years ago. 2004 was really a big setback for the industry yet since then it has evolved a lot. In last few years a lot of modification has been made. At least one agency (CSDS) has predicted almost 90% elections rightly and this is high standard for any such polls. It has called right politically tough states like UP on more than one occasion. In fact a lot of credibility associated with AAP (which is also pooh-poohing these polls) is that one of its leaders, Yogendra Yadav, has been one of the pioneers of such kind of fine-tuning of electoral fortunetelling in India and thus people rely on what he says. Just because he has been good at telling at who will win people are now relying on his words on who should win. Nothing more can be a more fitting to reply an allegation against the reliability of the polls. Even other agencies are learning fast and in 2013 Delhi polls when all the big time agencies got their numbers wrong a new agency called Today’s Chanakya got it bang on in its exit poll.

http://www.firstpost.com/politics/aaps-delhi-sweep-the-only-exit-poll-that-got-it-right-1276857.html

So the Delhi elections was not only a big cause of jubilation for AAP but also Today’s Chanakya. Yet it is ironical that while people see AAP’s feat as a miracle they still say that Today’s call was a fluke. Is it not double standard?

Myth 2 :- They can tell us something about Assembly elections but are not that useful in a Lok Sabha poll.

Reality :- Yes the solution has not been so perfect for the national level picture. But 2009 was not a washout like 2004. As early as in January 2009 CSDS gave UPA a seat range of 215-235, in March 2009 Start News gave UPA as many as 257 seats. In reality UPA got 262. In no way it can be said that they can got the picture, yes they got it a bit off the mark still they clearly said that who will win and did not go wrong. Interestingly these agencies faltered a bit more in their exit polls which is generally seen more reliable. CSDS gave UPA 185-205 seats and NDA 165-185 seats, Star News-Nielsen’s number was UPA-199 and NDA-196. So what went wrong? Actually these pollsters did not miss the fact that UPA was ahead and NDA was behind, but they completely missed the big picture for the Third Front and South India. AIADMK and TDP’s numbers were totally skewed and it added a lot of weight to Congress’s numbers. Similar was the case for Left in Bengal and Kerala. In UP too third and fourth front parties like SP and BSP performed much worse than they were expected. So UPA benefitted from decisive mandate against the non-NDA opposition. Since the UPA was frontrunner naturally it benefitted from the swing away from regional parties in several states.  So the agencies will have to fine-tune their strategy a bit more when they are assessing the real strength of regional parties. This time too parties like YSRCP, TMC, TRS, AIADMK are getting a lot of attention. If these numbers go wrong they are going to impact the number of leading coalitions in the big way and may once again strengthen the chorus of opinion polls being unreliable in presenting a national picture.

Myth 3 :- It gives BJP more seats and always underestimates parties like BSP and never capture the true strength of Congress

Reality : -  This was the case in past but in the last few years, after facing flak constantly on this issue, the agencies have changed their methods and in last few years they have been somehow overestimating BSP and Congress. In UP in 2012 everybody gave big numbers to BSP. In Opinion Polls nobody was ready to give it less than 100 seats. In exit poll star news was closest with 83 seats. The INC-RLD combine was given 99 seats by Star News in its opinion polls while in Exit Poll it gave them 51 seats. In reality BSP  got 80 and RLD-Congress got only 37.  The CSDS poll gave BJP just 28-30 seats to BJP in its exit poll whereas it got 50 seats. 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uttar_Pradesh_Legislative_Assembly_election,_2012

In the case of Bihar in 2010 nobody was ready to give BJP more than 60 seats when it got 90+ seats in reality. INC was constantly given more than 20 seats when it got only 4. So the question of overestimating BJP is itself an overstatement.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bihar_Legislative_Assembly_election,_2010

So what is the key flaw?   

One of the major shortcomings of the Opinion Poll business is that it is not adaptable to gauge the impact of a newcomer in political fray. In Andhra it could not predict how PRP’s entry will impact TDP. In Tamil Nadu it could not say how DMDK’s rising graph will benefit DMK. It was almost blind to MNS’s impact in Maharashtra. So a challenge before the industry is to call the multi-cornered contest in right way. This time too AAP has been present in a major part of the country. It will be a bit tricky to predict what will be the final impact of its latent force. Yet you can trust these polls to find out who is ahead. 2004 was an aberration and it is not going to be repeated. For all other things you can keep coming to this blog for getting the better picture of the electoral game.  

How Alliance work at the grass root level :- an insider story

My promised piece of Assam is taking some time as my source in Guwahati is still reconfirming some facts but here I am sharing a real time anecdote that explains how an alliance can suddenly turn into a dalliance and how micromanagement at the ground level can save embarrassment in such a tricky situation. This is about 2010 assembly election in Bihar…

My home constituency Jandaha was dissolved during the delimitation. It was now part of Mahnar constituency Sitting MLAs of both Mahnar and Jandaha were LJP men.  Jandaha was a JD-U seat and Mahnar was a BJP seat. Now after delimitation Mahnar was allocated to BJP. Jandaha MLA (Achutanand Singh) was left in lurch as Mahnar MLA (Rama Singh) was more likely to get nomination from LJP. BJP was also in a dire situation as its local candidate in Mahnar had failed to gain any foothold in the past few elections and a change of candidate was required. So Achutanand shifted side and joined LJP and thus got nominated. On the other side of divide the RJD-LJP alliance was also severally affected. Jandaha was a RJD seat and Mahnar was LJP seat. Since both parties were in alliance this time, RJD conceded Mahnar seat to LJP. Thus RJD candidates of both Jandaha and Mahnar found themselves out of loop. As election days came closer rebellion started brewing on both side of divides. The previous RJD candidate from Jandaha Umesh Singh Kushwaha (now a JD-U leader and a close associate of Upendra Kushwaha) jumped into fray and threatened to take away Kurmi-Koeri vote from the official NDA nominee. Repeated plea to JD-U leaders failed to clear this hurdle. The talking heads of BJP went into huddle. The old RJD candidate Mushi Lal Rai (a respected but aged Yadav leader) was persuaded to file his nomination from Mahnar. Now the ruptures appeared in the RJD-LJP alliance too as RJD supporters refused to back Rama Singh (a local Rajput strongman). Now the stakes were even. The BJP candidate was solidly backed by upper caste votes (barring a section of Rajput votes behind the LJP candidate) and core BJP voters, LJP candidate was banking on his caste based support and Paswan votes, JD-U rebel had good going with the traditional JD-U voters and rebel RJD candidate had Yadavs backing him solidly. Muslim vote was divided among all non-BJP candidates. All alliances were present on paper but on ground none were working. Now what was the final outcome? Hold your breath because this is going to give you a ringside view of what is going to happen in many constituencies in Bihar in 2014. The BJP candidate won with a tiny amount of votes 29754 votes out of total 118972 valid votes. The LJP candidate got 27265 votes. The winning margin was 2489 votes. And what the rebels got is truly awesome. The RJD rebel got 20757 votes while the JD-U rebel got 18322 votes. Had it not been the micromanagement done by local BJP unit, LJP would have carried the day hands down. Yet we all thought that 2010 Bihar assembly election was won by a solid NDA alliance and development plank of the Nitish administration. I was in Delhi when results were announced and all the TV channels were interpreting the results in their own way. But having the ground level experience I was only smiling at their wisdom. This story is not an isolated event. It took place in several dozen constituencies and in some way the swiftness of break-up in BJP-JD (U) alliance and RJD-LJP alliance traces their origin from several such tales. Alliances may be switched up by the top leadership yet unless the local units gel together they are more liability than an asset and I can sense a similar kind of uneasiness in RJD-Congress alliance where the traditional RJD voters are not ready to vote for INC. RVP has learnt his lessons, RaGa is expected to learn it in hard way post May 16, 2014. 

Alliances that work and those who do not? A ringside view

My promised piece of Assam is taking some time as my source in Guwahati is still reconfirming some facts but here I am sharing a real time anecdote that explains how an alliance can suddenly turn into a dalliance and how micromanagement at the ground level can save embarrassment in such a tricky situation. This is about 2010 assembly election in Bihar…

My home constituency Jandaha was dissolved during the delimitation. It was now part of Mahnar constituency Sitting MLAs of both Mahnar and Jandaha were LJP men.  Jandaha was a JD-U seat and Mahnar was a BJP seat. Now after delimitation Mahnar was allocated to BJP. Jandaha MLA (Achutanand Singh) was left in lurch as Mahnar MLA (Rama Singh) was more likely to get nomination from LJP. BJP was also in a dire situation as its local candidate in Mahnar had failed to gain any foothold in the past few elections and a change of candidate was required. So Achutanand shifted side and joined LJP and thus got nominated. On the other side of divide the RJD-LJP alliance was also severally affected. Jandaha was a RJD seat and Mahnar was LJP seat. Since both parties were in alliance this time, RJD conceded Mahnar seat to LJP. Thus RJD candidates of both Jandaha and Mahnar found themselves out of loop. As election days came closer rebellion started brewing on both side of divides. The previous RJD candidate from Jandaha Umesh Singh Kushwaha (now a JD-U leader and a close associate of Upendra Kushwaha) jumped into fray and threatened to take away Kurmi-Koeri vote from the official NDA nominee. Repeated plea to JD-U leaders failed to clear this hurdle. The talking heads of BJP went into huddle. The old RJD candidate Mushi Lal Rai (a respected but aged Yadav leader) was persuaded to file his nomination from Mahnar. Now the ruptures appeared in the RJD-LJP alliance too as RJD supporters refused to back Rama Singh (a local Rajput strongman). Now the stakes were even. The BJP candidate was solidly backed by upper caste votes (barring a section of Rajput votes behind the LJP candidate) and core BJP voters, LJP candidate was banking on his caste based support and Paswan votes, JD-U rebel had good going with the traditional JD-U voters and rebel RJD candidate had Yadavs backing him solidly. Muslim vote was divided among all non-BJP candidates. All alliances were present on paper but on ground none were working. Now what was the final outcome? Hold your breath because this is going to give you a ringside view of what is going to happen in many constituencies in Bihar in 2014. The BJP candidate won with a tiny amount of votes 29754 votes out of total 118972 valid votes. The LJP candidate got 27265 votes. The winning margin was 2489 votes. And what the rebels got is truly awesome. The RJD rebel got 20757 votes while the JD-U rebel got 18322 votes. Had it not been the micromanagement done by local BJP unit, LJP would have carried the day hands down. Yet we all thought that 2010 Bihar assembly election was won by a solid NDA alliance and development plank of the Nitish administration. I was in Delhi when results were announced and all the TV channels were interpreting the results in their own way. But having the ground level experience I was only smiling at their wisdom. This story is not an isolated event. It took place in several dozen constituencies and in some way the swiftness of break-up in BJP-JD (U) alliance and RJD-LJP alliance traces their origin from several such tales. Alliances may be switched up by the top leadership yet unless the local units gel together they are more liability than an asset and I can sense a similar kind of uneasiness in RJD-Congress alliance where the traditional RJD voters are not ready to vote for INC. RVP has learnt his lessons, RaGa is expected to learn it in hard way post May 16, 2014. 

Will Nitish's WMD work in 2014?

It has begun…

The 2014 General elections – one of the most critical elections of our times – is now real. The dates have come out and finally we are going to see an epic battle (mind it that this is not 2004 or 2009). This is going to be the one that defines the future of at least two generations –ours as well as our kids. Who wins or who loses only time will tell. But as far as my understanding of things are concerned it is too close to call. Contrary to what many pollsters say the BJP is nowhere close to podium yet it is not out of race either. In the course of next few weeks I will be sharing my views – as well as some grapevine items that I regularly get from my friends in media - with you guys. In this piece however I am starting a series to discuss what is the current state of affairs of the electoral politics in several states and to start with let us have a look at native state i.e. Bihar – a place where politics is lived, breathed and discussed all the time. Though it is almost impossible to see through the murky political scene in the state – where decades of conventional political settings have been disturbed in last few months – yet let me wear my psephological hat once again and try to see what many find amusing about the peculiar state of affairs in this state that sends 40 MPs to the parliament. For your benefit I am discussing the prospects of various parties/alliances one by one and my most recent point of reference is the CSDS-CNN-IBN election tracker (which I found most credible given their past records). So let us go….

The BJP-LJP Alliance

The tracker gives this alliance the pole position with almost 40% votes and 22-30 seats. I have some differences with it. Though when I was talking to my most trusted source at the time of BJP-JD(U) split he said BJP will get 24 seats on its own if this happens, I did not believe him then and I refuse to do so even now. The alliance may be ahead at this point of time giving it 30 seats it to it is not prudent. There are several reasons to it. BJP is contesting only 30 seats in the state and its allies do not even have ten credible people to put up candidates in the rest of seats. I am not the view that the non-BJP votes will swing to LJP-RLSP only in the name of Modi. Take the example of Vaishali. LJP is likely to put up Rama Singh from this constituency. I loathe to accept that even his own caste will back him against someone like Raghuvansh Prasad Singh who carried the seat even in 2009 anti-RJD wave. So I do not expect the allies to carry more than 3 or at the most 4 out of 10 seats allotted to them.  

Now come to BJP part. Of the 30 seats it is likely to contest many are gone case. Take the example of Katihar. Even when the JD-U vote was entirely behind it BJP won this seat by a slender margin of 14000. In 2004 when NCP candidate was backed by RJD the margin was even slimmer say 2500 votes. Now the JD-U vote is no longer with BJP and there is not enough space to cut into RJD votes as Tariq Anwar is formidable candidate here. So the seat is a goner. Similar is the case of seats like Darbhanga (winning margin 47000 in 2009, Cong. got 40724 votes, In 2004 RJD had won by 143000), Madhubani (winning margin 10000 in 2009, Cong. got 111423 votes, In 2004 Cong. had won by 81000) etc. are gone cases for BJP. Seats like Madhepura, Siwan, Kishanganj, Supaul, Nalanda, etc. are clearly out of reach for BJP as many of them are completely dominated by groups who are not supposed to vote for BJP as their first choice of votes. Muslims are not going to back this alliance at any cost, Yadavs (CSDS poll says some 28% Yadavs are voting for them) will not vote for it unless RJD-Cong. is a gone case (as they are not in these seats) and Kurmi votes (CSDS gives 40% KK votes to the alliance) will not swing to it unless they are the only party than beat RJD. So the alliance is not in a formidable position in more than 25 seats in the state. In fact most of the seats given to the allies – barring the case of Hajipur – were those that could have been won by BJP as most of them were not pocket borough of any party and the social coalition in those seats were quite flexible. A reasoning given behind this was that most of them were JD-U seats. Yet I am very much confused with BJP’s fascination about sitting MPs. As I have gone through the data sheet in Bihar one thing is clear, barring a few heavyweights MPs do not get re-elected. The anti-incumbency against MPs is too high. One of the silver linings of NDA split was the hope that BJP could get some of the JD-U seats and JD-U could unseat a few BJP MPs. That hope is gone at least in BJP’s case. Again BJP – after barring 1984 and 1991 – has never contested all 40 seats in Bihar. The results in both these polls were disastrous. Yes the party has gained political weights tremendously since then but all said and done on at least a dozen seats it is staring in black hole regarding outcome. This may have prompted them in jettisoning some of the seats. Still I find too many ifs and buts associated with BJP’s chances on many of these seats. Though I will be able to predict seat wise scenario only is my next blog, at this point of time I do not see this grouping crossing 20 seats (at most 16 for BJP and 4 to the allies) in Bihar.   

RJD-Cong. alliance – On the paper – despite loss of LJP- this alliance still remains a lot heavier than the other two formations by the number of committed voters. The alliance can go to poll with at least 20% of votes assured to its kitty. No other formation can claim it. As Cong. is the national competition for Modi and BJP Muslims are now going to throw their full weight behind this alliance and so are Yadavs. This alliance is also fielding some of the biggest Muslim names in the state. RJD has fielded Muslim candidates from Begusarai, Darbhanga, Madhubani, Shivhar, Siwan and Araria seats. Cong.-NCP will also field at least 3-4 more candidates from this community. Unless JD-U finds some heavyweights to counter them there victory is all but assured due to division in NDA votes. RJD is also gainer because it is the only party which has the experience of fighting almost all 40 seats in the state and has party presence upto booth levels in all these seats. So by default it is going to benefit from division in anti-Laloo votes and I will be surprised if fails to cross double digit mark on its own.  Yet there is a caveat to all this. As the RJD’s Candidate list reveals to us in order to stop rebellion and gain from experience of its leaders, RJD has reputed most of its 2009 candidates. Names like Raghunath Jha, Anwarul Haque, Alok Mehta, Ramji Manjhi, Taslimuddin, Magni Lal Mandal etc. do not reflect well with the RJD voters. It has to be noted that younger lots among RJD voters have already rejected most of them and especially the first time Yadav voters (somewhat more attracted towards Modi) may reject some of them in favour of BJP-LJP alliance. Names like Pragati Mehta (Munger) and Sudhanshu Shekhar (Jamui) along with Misa Bharti in Patliputra is not enough for RJD to attract the first time voters.

As far as its alliance partner Congress is concerned. It is very unlikely that it will find much traction among RJD voters. Muslims may still vote for it but Yadavs will have no reason to back the much-maligned Congress which is making their day-to-day life more difficult. Most of the seats Congress has got – barring Sasaram, Kishanganj, Aurangabad and Supaul - are gone case. Even in Kishanganj Congress may find it difficult to retain the seat as the probable AAP candidate Parveen Amanullah (daughter of ex-MP Md. Shahhbuddin) can win this seat on her own. It is to be reminded that Kishanganj muslims – just like Madhepura Yadavs – are enlightened lot and for them backing an AAP candidate with an impeccable integrity should not be a far-fetched idea. So for Congress to add anything to its couple of seats in Bihar will be a herculean task. NCP may find it a bit easy (as explained earlier) to win its seat. Thus the RJD-Congress –NCP alliance can win minimum 10 to maximum 15 seats in the state.

JD-U – The most desperate situation is that of JD-U. Just like BJP it is for the first time that JD-U is going to contest all the seats on its own and there is serious paucity of candidates. Old MPs are deserting and poaching new ones from RJD (particularly after Congress alliance) is proving too difficult. Added to it woes is the fact that the party has no formidable caste coalition of fall back upon. Nitish Kumar may harp on the fact that Bihar has moved ahead from the status of voting on caste lines but as Maharajganj by-election has shown without BJP support JD-U will find it difficult to win a large number of seats. The CSDS poll gives it around 6 seats in the state and a few JD-U leaders are livid that how JD-U can go to such a low after winning 20 seats in 2009. But it had happened in 2004 after the high of 1999 and while Nitish may blame Modi for that debacle it is again facing a similar rout thanks to Modi again (though under a very different set of circumstances).

Nitish’s greatest hope to pull a rabbit out of hat is based on die-hard support from Kurmi voters (3.8 percent) and cornering a good payback from Muslims for the work done by his administration (and I refuse it to call a JD-U government now it is clearly Nitish administration where he is calling all the shots) and parting away from Modi on their behalf. Yet with RJD tying up with Congress Muslims will not vote against RJD because if they do so, Yadav vote will automatically go to BJP to defeat Nitish’s candidate. Since Muslims do tactical voting they will not vote for JD-U unless they are sure that there is no other way to defeat BJP. Hence the bigger source of hope for Nitish is the 21.3 percent extremely backward castes and a large traction of what he calls Mahadalit votes. But the problem with this vote bank is they need a greater force to bind them together and protect them if there is backlash against them for voting for any party. In fact in Bihar Yadav, Bhumihar, Rajputs and Dusadh are the castes that act as galvanizers. When BJP was with JD-U the EBC and Mahadalit could vote for NDA without fearing any kind of repercussions. They knew that is they vote for NDA the candidate will surely win and even if they lose there is a formidable force to protect their interest. This time it is not so. There are not even a half dozen seats where JD-U candidate can be called frontrunner and there are apprehensions about survival of Nitish government post-May elections hence supporting JD-U may not be a great idea for them. They are likely to vote for front runners (say for BJP in Patna Saheb and RJD in Madhepura). Still there is a caveat. Nitish government has done a lot for these people and there is wish in these ranks to return the favour. So if Nitish finds some good candidates they can break bread with JD-U too. BJP’s greatest hope is also hinged upon taking away these fringe votes. But it should know that JD-U was a bridge between the two. Since they have burnt it they will have to cross a great social divide to assimilate them in their ways. It is very unlikely that the Bihar BJP leadership – so much dominated by upper caste leaders – which is still finding it hard to co-opt with Ram Vilas Paswan will be able to arouse much trust in them. JD-U may pull out a surprise here. And the last point is the most fascinating in JD-U story. During the assembly election 2010 – I spent a large time in Bihar during those elections – I found it amazing that women were the main driving force behind NDA’s surprise victory in many seats. Women – irrespective of their caste identity – voted for NDA candidates especially those belonging to JD-U. The trend was more obvious in upper caste women, Muslim women and Dalit women. But I am sure that this was also true for Yadav women though not open for obvious reasons. I have seen that in Delhi assembly election first time voters openly defied the elders in their family to vote for AAP. The same happen in the case of JD-U as far as women of Bihar are concerned and mind you they constitute around 45% of Bihar electorate. If this happens JD-U can surprise BJP in many urban seats, though it will not be able to penetrate RJD strongholds. So the WMD Equation – Women, Muslims, Dalit – can be the biggest arrow in Nitish’s quiver in this election. (I know the term carries a negative connation still it can be spin doctored as “We Mean Development”). Still all these positive scenarios are fickle and fictitious as of now. If the Bihar votes in conventional way – or even if the same way as it did in 2010 assembly elections – JD(U) should feel itself blessed if it crosses its seat tally of 2004.

That is all I can say about Bihar politics at this point of time. Tomorrow I will follow-up with a true grass root level story of coalition politics and my take on state of affairs in Assam.