The Political version of 2 States - My take on on Andhra Politics

The state which used to have largest number of seats in Lok Sabha from among the Southern State has several reputations to its credit. In the past it used to defy national waves (like the Janta wave of 1977 and   Rajiv wave of 1984) yet over the last two decades it has acquired a reputation of being a bell-weather state. In 1999, 2004 and 2009 it played a big part in boosting the numbers of the ruling coalition in New Delhi and provided it with a bit of stability. Had it not been for AP (along with Tamil Nadu), Congress’s efforts of coming back to power may not have succeeded in 2004. So it is natural that all political coalition would look towards this state with some kind of hope. Still from 2009 a lot has changed for this state. Its clout is going to be reduced after it gets divided in two states from June 2, 2014 onwards. Though the official declaration of partition is yet to take place, the division on the ground is much clearer. The bitterness of division is so acrid that significant players in one part of state are reduced to margins in the other part. So it will be futile to analyze the two potential states as one political entity. So let us have a look at state of political affairs in these states separately.

Telengana

Telangana with 17 seats to its kitty is one region where the Congress’s game plan for elections may be bearing the expected kind of results. When the Congress high command realized the mess created by post-YSR leaders in Andhra they knew that they stand very little chance to counter the threats posed by YSR Congress and TDP in United Andhra. Thus they adopted a ploy to divide and rule. The expectation of the Congress party was to sweep all 17 seats in the region after the proposed merger of KCR-led TRS in Congress. Yet it did not happen. KCR is a maverick and he knew that in Congress he will never be able to call the shots. So he tried to keep his identity and asked for an alliance. Congress did not concede to this demand as they knew that KCR is a political drifter and may swing to other side at only a slight chance of advantage. So it opted for a gamble and is contesting alone. Many see this as an ill calculated move.  Yet my senses say that might not be the case. TRS may have been at the forefront of the agitation in Telangana yet people in the region know that it had not been possible for them to gain statehood if the Congress president had not put the weight behind this decision. They know that this is creating a uncomfortable situation for Congress in Seemandhra where it is being routed. This is creating some sort of sympathy undercurrent for Congress which is not translating into a wave only due to poor governance of UPA in Delhi. Yet Congress may have an upper hand in this region. Historically parties leading a partition movement have not been able to gain politically after the creation of the state. JMM in Jharkhand and UKD in Uttaranchal are examples of this phenomenon. JMM has been able to keep itself afloat only due to fact that it is the main tribal based party in the region otherwise it too may have been decimated like UKD. TRS’s own political record is not good. It does not have a political organization to convert the momentum into seats. Opinion polls are giving it 7 to 9 seats but I doubt that they will fare so well, especially in the parliamentary polls. Congress with a well-oiled election machinery and gamut of experienced leaders fighting on its ticket may beat TRS in several seats. Since in most of the seats it is a direct fight between TRS and Congress the financial might of later may pull the balance in its favour. The most recent decision to give reservations to minority community may give Congress the much needed additional strength in an election where the Muslim votes are already clutching the Hand in a big way. Only in Hyderabad it can result in some sort of polarization which can bring back BJP-TDP alliance in contention. It can also have some polarizing effect on couple of other seats. So in the end BJP-TDP alliance may not be a player in more than 3 to 4 seats any should consider itself lucky if it can grab  any seat(s).    

So the predictions for Telangana is –

Congress – 10 to 12 seats TRS – 4 to 6 seats, BJP-TDP – 1 to 2 seats, MIM 0-1 seat.

Seemandhra

The YSR Congress’s debut test

While Congress can only hope to reap the political harvest of AP’s division in Telangana, the negative consequences of the same is clear for it in Seemandhra where its entire political vote bank has been usurped by YSR Congress and a substantial part of its leadership has joined TDP. The rest is only expecting the tide over the bad waves and live another day to fight. Gaining even one seat in the state will be a miracle for Congress even after the Muslim gambit. So who will be the real beneficiary of Congress’s rout in the state? Most of the polls initially said it is Jagan Mohan Reddy’s outfit YSR Congress. Yet many of them have rectified their position and now say that the fight is even between the BJP-TDP alliance and the YSR Congress. So what has changed in the recent days? Actually nothing but the way we interpret the political situation in the state. The buzz around YSR Congress is due to fact that it is now a single torch-bearer of the Reddy clan who has been ruling the Andhra politics for years. They have been the real beneficiary from the exploitation of Telangana landmass and its population. Now they fear loss of political as well as economical benefits. That is why they are united behind YSR’s son. Just like the Modi wave in the UP and Bihar is looking strong because the Upper caste are putting their weight behind it, the YSR Congress is being projected as a leader in Seemandhra. But in reality both of them have big challenges before them.

To start with Congress’s victory in Andhra in 2009 under YSR’s leadership was more due to his poltical foresight rather than his popularity in the state. There was a massive 7% swing against Congress as compared to 2004 in the parliamentary polls of 2009. But most of it was captured by Chiranjeevi’s PRP which got more than 1,50,000 votes in around 10 constituencies. The Kapu vote, which was agitating against the Reddy domination, was skillfully stopped to align with Kamma vote of TDP and it severely dented the chances of Chandra Babu Nadu’s chances of reclaiming the political space in the state. Again since TDP has never been a finance rich party its inability to counter Congress’s money power was also a big factor in its total defeat. This time the situation has changed. Chiranjeevi’s party is no longer a player and since he realizes that Congress has no chance to counter Jagan in Seemanadhra he has played another card by floating Jan Sena under the leadership of his brother Pawan Kalyan. Since Jan Sena is not contesting elections this time the Kapu vote is going to TDP-BJP alliance en block. Even the Dalits – Malas and Madigas- are not too happy with the Reddy domination and at least in Rayalseema they may back TDP-BJP. This makes YSR Congress unsteady in Rayalseema while they retain the front running position in Coastal Andhra. What is also benefitting YSR Congress is that Jagan still has a sizable amount of wealth at his disposal and among all regional parties (barring probably SP) his coffers are fuller. Since the Modi factor is not big in Seemandhra money can be a prime motivator for many to vote. Jagan – due to demise of his father – is also not carrying any political baggage and the charges of corruption against him – due to the fact that they were slapped on him only after he parted ways with Congress – is not becoming an issue, particularly among the Reddy dominated area.

So for whom Seemandhra will root for?

Having said all that recently there has been a realization that the bifurcation of the state is a done deal and now there is no benefit in opposing it. Jagan’s only achievement thus far has been his whole hearted opposition to division. But is it enough to give him the chair? The cases against Jagan are serious – even though politically motivated. Any leader worth his salt in Delhi can easily manipulate him using CBI as a tool. Even is the YSR Congress gets a majority Jagan may not be able to become CM because the court can cancel his bail any moment. So is Seemandhra prepared to see a Rabri moment where either Jagan Mohan’s mother or sister can be asked to rule as procy? I doubt that it is. Even Jagan has realized that he can not afford to offend any ruler in Delhi and that is why he is being soft on Modi and BJP. This has made the situation of Muslims in Seemandhra quite perplexing. Even though they are just about 8 to 9 percent of the total population yet they can play a big role in constituencies where the Reddy support is not enough for Jagan to win. But now they look flummoxed. They do not have the option to vote for Congress as it is not a player in the state. Still there is more chance of Jagan going with a Third Front-led, UPA supported government. So they may vouch for him. Still I expect that voting in Muslim dominated areas in Seemandhra is going to be low and this will further help TDP-BJP.

So what is the final word from Seemnadhra

It is a bit tough to predict. We may not see a wave yet but last few elections in Andhra have been lopsided one. Any coalition can easily get 20 out of 25 Seemandhra seats if it plays its cards well. Still I will say it is advantage TDP-BJP at this point of time. Yet if a simple prediction is to be made I will say TDP-BJP 12-16, YSR Congress – 10-14, with both sides having a chance to sweep the stakes.    

Taking on the tough task of Tamil Nadu

Predicting an election in Tamil Nadu has long been a psepholgist’s nightmare. In the last three to four elections seldom any opinion poll has captured the mood in Tamil Nadu to any degree of credibility. So the best of scientific polls in this part of country is just another guess where yours is as good as mines. Why I am speaking so? Let us have a look at some recent trends. In 2004, after spectacular victory of AIADMK in 2002 and the point that DMK was a big winner in 1999, everybody was of the hope that Jaya is primed for a big haul. So big was this hype that it even prompted BJP to break its alliance with DMK  and adopt AIADMK is its last minute ally. Even the mighty RAJNIKANT was fooled by this ‘wave’ and that is why he endorsed the BJP-AIADMAK alliance in more than a subtle way. The result is for all of us to see. AIADMK-BJP was blanked and DMK-Congress alliance got all 39 seats plus Pondicherry and it was vital cog in the upset of 2004 elections. Nobody, apart from Rajnikant, learned anything from this fiasco and everybody continued weigh electoral politics in TN in the same way considering the 2004 results as an anomaly. So several opinion polls in 2009 once again predicted a big win for the AIADMK because they thought that many DMK MPs will lose their seats because of the two terms of incumbency -an unimaginable situation in the musical chair like politics of Tamil Nadu. Yet the Congress-DMK alliance stunned all the naysayers and once again AIADMK’s tally was reduced to a single digit tally. Pollsters now assumed that they are wrong in analyzing Jaya’s strength as a formidable leader and thus when the 2012 round of Assembly elections took place they predicted a close fight between Jaya and Karuna led parties. But once again they were proved wrong as Jaya won a landslide victory along with her partner Captain Vijaykant’s DMDK.  So when the 2014 round of Lok Sabha elections came, the pollsters once again found themselves in a fix. Initially they followed the old formula and predicted a sweep for Jaya. But as the days are progressing some of them are having doubts. The fact that AIADMK is fighting virtually alone in this ‘land of alliances’ and also that rural parts of Tamil Nadu are facing severe water and power crisis has led to a believe that the 2004 kind of fiasco may repeat once again. Though nobody has yet been brave enough to predict a rout for AIADMK, still several pollsters are now calling 2014 as an even fight (just like 2012 Assembly elections!) between the two major parties. Now let us analyse why it is so tough to predict Tamil Nadu nowadays.

The land of Rainbow alliances

In the 70’s, 80’s and 90’s the Tamil Nadu politics was a two and a half horse race. Congress has a formidable base in the state (around 13% of votes) and whichever of the DMKs aligned with it usually swept the elections. The only exception of this rule was 1999 polls when DMK-BJP’s rainbow alliance with MDMK and PMK outwitted the Cong.-AIADMK alliance. From here the politics of TN took a big turn. A large chunk of votes from the DMK and AIADMK was transferred to their minor partners and became an integral part of their vote share. In 2004 while AIADMK allied with DMK the rainbow coalition was very much in place and Congress simply replaced BJP in this coalition. That is why DMK was able to replicate its success in 1999 in 2004 as well. In 2009, AIADMK leant its lessons and aligned with MDMK while PMK was still in the UPA camp. But by then another grouping had emerged to make the situation further murky in the Tamil Nadu politics. There was a sizeable drop of around 6% in the overall vote share of UPA in the state. Had this vote been directly transferred to AIADMK (as was the case in the past) a rout of UPA was unavoidable. But DMDK’s emergence and the fact that it got around 10% of votes in the very first election it fought doomed the AIADMK’s fate and despite posing a serious challenge to the UPA candidates (especially the non-DMK ones) AIADMK could get only nine seats. Jaya realized it and aligned with Captain in 2012 polls. This time the number crunchers were not sure whether Captain will be able to transfer his votes to AIADMK and also whether or not DMDK’s performance in 2009 was a fluke. So they played safe and predicted a tough fight. But in the end both these apprehensions proved wrong and both Jaya and Captain benefitted immensely from this alliance. Had this alliance been not in place, this would have been indeed a very close fight between DMK and AIADMK. So the last few elections proved that in Tamil Nadu it is alliances and not the parties or candidates which decide the fate of electoral outcome. Or is it so?

The strange 2014 situation

With such a good case being there for forging alliances (many of us may think it is politically suicidal to not have one) it is quite amazing that both the bigger parties in Tamil Nadu paid no heed to feelers from other parties to come along. Soon after coming to power Jaya elected DMDK just as a rocket jettisons its boosters after the launch. DMK also broke its 10 years old alliance with Congress and both of them paid no attention to align with wither MDMK or PMK. Quite strangely DMDK (which already considers itself as a big alternative in TN) was willing to fight till the very last moment. In the last phase DMK also considered an alliance with Captain’s outfit, but by then it was too late to negotiate with Captain who considers himself as future CM of Tamil Nadu. So we have a very peculiar situation in Tamil Nadu where both DMK and AIADMK are aligned with neither any national party nor any regional once.  As a result we are having four-cornered (in theory) and three-cornered (in practical) on each and every seat of the state. A multi-corner contest in Tamil Nadu is a quite new phenomenon. As we know a truly multi corner contest can give you a large number of seats with very few votes. Example is UP where once you pass the 30% mark you can win majority of seats. However, in Tamil Nadu both the DMKs have more than 30% cadre vote which hardly swings from one party to the other. So the situation becomes trickier to analyze. However as a political crystal gazer (albeit an amateur one) it is my duty to see through the maze and give you some shot of snapshot of what is going to happen in the state in the current round of elections. Let me do it by discussing the chances of all political formations one by one.

AIADMAK

The ruling party seems to be forerunner on all counts. One, in a multi-corner contest the ruling party always has an upper hand. Example- AP and Maharashtra. An age old psephological formula called index of opposition unity (which has been reduced to margins in many states yet may be a factor in Tamil Nadu) is working in its fovour. Second, its MP candidates are fairly new and do not have to face anti-incumbency against them as is case with several DMK and Congress candidates. Third, the pro-poor schemes launched by AIADMK have made a big inroad in rural areas also where DMK had been traditionally strong. The cheaper food scheme is as popular as that of Raman Singh’s in Chhatisgarh. Fourth, in a state where corruption has always been a big issue the current Jayalalitha government has remarkably been free of graft for more than two and half years. That is also sending good feelers to the floating voters who are now supporting Jaya against DMK which has refused to act against A Raja and has given him ticket. Fifth, Jaya has positioned herself quite cleverly in the national politics. By keeping herself equidistance from both the hypothetical third front and the NDA, she has made sure that see remains relevant in the national politics, whatever is the result on May 16. As she is considered close to Narendra Modi, the Modi supporters in many seats where NDA is not in fight (and there are close to two dozen seats in this category) are rooting for Jayalalitha in the hope that she will ultimately support her good friend when her support is all which can make the difference. Yet if she performs spectacularly, by getting more than 30 seats, she may become the fulcrum of a larger alliance that can stop Modi from becoming PM. So she is having an upper hand at the moment. Still she has many problems as well. The AIADMK vote share in recent years has never been more than 35% on its own and it has always consisted of a good vote from the minority section. Her perceived closeness with NaMo which is working for her in several constituencies is also depriving her from the minority votes. All experts say that about 75% of Muslim votes and 40% of Christian vote is going to DMK. This can make a difference for AIADMK in more than half a dozen seats. How she counters this threat can be an interesting thing to witness. Again Tamil Nadu being an industrial state cannot be satisfied with pro-poor policies only. The lack of electricity is breaking the back of many SMEs in the state and AIADMK may have to face the ire of their owners as well as workers. Apart from it Jaya is earning a tag of unreliable ally. She still has the old stigma of ditching Vajpayee in 1999. More recently her mover to jettison DMDK after the assembly election and leaving Left parties high and dry after almost stitching a pact with them for the Lak Sabha elections has only provided credibility to the line of thought that she cannot be trusted for playing a larger role on the national level on behalf of Tamil Nadu. All these factors may under-cut any kind of political advantage AIADMK may be having due to multi-cornered contests and may stop it from sweeping the stakes. In my view AIADMK may bag 20 to 25 seats in the state in this election. Any number that is lower than 20 will be a surprise as well as any number up from 25 onwards.

DMK

When the bugle for 2014 elections was sounded, DMK looked the most handicapped of all the political parties in India. It not only lost its long standing allies (just like JD-U), but was out of power both in the state as well as center (just like BSP), it was also facing a crisis in its first family (just like Shiv Sena) and its key members were suffering severe charges for corruption (just like RJD). Yet apart from RJD it is the only party that has gained in the run-up to the elections. Though getting back as its 19 MPs reelected this time will be not possible. DMK will not suffer a crippling blow in terms of its vote share (which will be marginally down by 2 to 3%). It is also emerging clear winner in at least 6 to 8 seats and a double digit tally for the original Dravidian party should not surprise anyone. So how this turnaround was achieved? Firstly by breaking alliance with Congress it made sure that it gets to fight as many seats as possible. It has realized that incumbency against local MPs can be the best armor against the strong anti-UPA wave in the constituency. As of now DMK is contesting in 20 seats which did not elect a UPA MP in 2009. More than half of DMK MPs to the 16^th Lok Sabha will be elected from these constituencies only. Again by breaking away from UPA it has also made it clear that just like AIADMK it is ready to play ball with any player which has a chance to form government in the center. Stalin’s recent pro-Modi remarks can be seen as a proof of this. This is confusing some voters which is not against Modi but is also not in favour of supporting Jaya or her local MP. Though this ploy may not be successful in a big way, it can tilt the balance in many seats. Again the firm hand of Stalin behind the campaign and selection of candidates is also working for DMK in many seats, particularly those who do not have DMK MPs. Most of the Stalin supporters are long time politicians with good local connections. His image as an able administrator has also energized the core DMK votes (just like Akhilesh has done for SP) which was not happy with dominance of Marans, Alagiri and Kanimozhi in DMK politics. The purge of Alagiri supporters has made the partly slimmer but more energetic. After many elections the party is fighting as a one unit. Together they may swim or sink depending on the electoral tides still the party will have a certain path to follow in the years to come. This has made DMK cadres happy as they now that their loyalty to a certain leader will be rewarded in time to come. Still DMK has many roadblocks too. Just like AIADMK it is also quite weak without an alliance. The uncertainty of role after May 16, is also stopping a strong minority consolidation in favour of the party. Biggest of all the party is facing a resource crunch. It is a known fact that in 2009 elections DMK spent crores of rupees to win certain seats in the state. This is no more the case. With Supreme Court’s close scrutiny of party funds and also the accounts of its key supporters money is not readily available this time. Alagiri was also a key fund raiser and loss of his Madurai set of donors may hamper the party more than the supposed loss of his political supporters. This has tied DMKs hand in many constituencies and it may not be able to pose a serious challenge to cash-rich AIADMK candidates in more than 20 seats. So realistically the party is in serious fight in only about 20-odd seats and may be able to win anything between 8 to 12 seats. However if this happens it will surely be rising from the ashes like story.

NDA

Another strange factor of the E-14 in TN is emergence of a non-DMK, non-AIADMK alliance with a sizeable electoral presence. The six-party rainbow coalition has a strong support of some 20% of TN voters and expects that the NaMo wave can give it an additional 5 to 7% vote which will make it a formidable player in the elections. Ever since DMDK emerged as the second largest party in the TN Assembly, it has maintained it is an alternative to the stalemate of TN politics which is held hostage to whims and fancies of certain individuals in two main parties of the state. This was precisely the reason why Jaya shut the door on Captain and later overturned the feelers from DMK for an alliance. It now hopes that the solid and consolidated vote bank of MDMK and PMK will make his party winner in many seats. But the problem of this alliance is its strongest link is its weakest also. DMDK has a strong 10-12% backing in the state but is spread thin across the constituencies. In 2009 elections DMDK could neither win a seat nor could it finish second anywhere in the state, partly because it was not part of any alliance. It had got more than couple of lakh votes in just 2 seats. Unlike many of the caste identity based parties DMDK does not have a huge area of influence. It can tilt the balance in favor of DMK or AIADMK in many seats if it aligns with them, but the wining ability factor of this party is susceptible. Since it is contesting largest number of seats among the NDA allies their numbers can be curtailed in a big way. If Captain can prove that he is winning (which is difficult to achieve this time) only then he can pluck the floating voters. Unlike DMDK, all other NDA parties MDMK, PMK and BJP do have their areas of influence but it is not more than 3 to 4 seats for all of them. Again PMK and MDMK have not contested alone for a longtime and nobody knows what their real vote share is. But this alliance has overcome many hurdles till now. First there was serious doubt that PMK and DMDK can overcome their mutual rivalry on several seats yet it happened. Then there were question marks on joint campaigning but it has also been sorted out and this is turning out the most balanced alliance campaigning anywhere in the country. The alliance partners have picked the baton of “Modi as PM” with glee and are running with it all the way to finish. Now only if Captain can transfer his share of solid backing to MDMK and PMK (particularly in Southern TN and Vanniyar dominated middle lands) another myth can be busted. As of now the alliance means serious business in about 10 to 15 seats and if everything goes to plan they may notch up a combined tally of 8 to 12 seats. However the real danger of this alliance is a big negative impact on AIADMK’s tally. If the alliance wins more than 10 seats, AIADMK’s numbers can slip below 20 and in the end it can impact the overall number of Modi supporters in Delhi. This is the irony with which the BJP is learning fast to live with.

Congress

It is for the first time that Congress is finding itself behind BJP in Tamil Nadu. But is also for the only the second time (after 1998 when it drew a blank) in four decades that the party is going solo in the state. Still I refuse to believe that Congress will get less seats than BJP in Tamil Nadu. The reason is that Congress has solid following in many seats and its vote share never plunged below 10%. In 1998 the Moopnar led TMC had walked away with a solid chunk of Congress votes. This time it is also not so. Again Congress has suffered in Tamil Nadu in recent times because the omission and commissions made by DMK while it got nothing out of it. The TN electorate knows the real brain behind 2G Scam and now that INC and DMK have parted way, many will not punish INC for it. Reports with me suggest that in seats which have a sizable presence of minority INC has comeback strongly. Since both DMK and AIADMK have not been harsh on BJP, the minority voters feel safer by clutching Congress’s hand. Many DMK voters are also ditching it because they see Congress as a real player in Delhi and not DMK. In fact Congress is benefitting more from split than DMK. This has made congress a serious player in about 6 seats and it may convert most of them into victory. However if this happens DMK numbers are certain to go down.

So what is the final word….

As TN is a psephologists’s nightmare allow me to take a liberty and sketch two possible scenario in the state :-

1.       If NaMo factor works – AIADMK 15 -20, DMK- 6 to 10, NDA – 6 to 10 Congress 2 to 5

2.       If NaMo factor does not work – AIADMK 25 -30, DMK- 6 to 10, NDA – 1 to 2 Congress 2 to 3

BJP’s Audacious Plans for Odisha

At a time when a leader who has been CM of a state since 2002 is selling himself as the most winnable candidate for PM post, we cannot ignore another leader who has been at the helm of affairs in his own state since 1999. Odisha CM Naveen Patnaik is now gunning for a straight fourth term as the CM of Odisha. Not a mean achievement for someone nicknamed “Pappu” which is synonymous for failure in India. The soft-spoken and poor orator Naveen stands apart from his more vocal and cunning East Indian counterparts like Nitish Kumar, Mamta Banerjee and Tarun Gogoi. Still no one doubts his credentials as a vote catcher and an above par administrator. Yet the election 2014 is not about Naveen in Odisha. The recent poll projections coming out of the state indicate a huge swing in favour of BJP – past ally of BJD – which has astonished both the supporters and opponents of BJP. Yet unlike other states pollsters do not agree on what is in store for the saffron outfit in this state. The opinion polls are quite gung-ho about its chances in the state. The March-April 2014 CSDS election tracker has put BJP in the second place behind BJD in the state. But the margin is very thin 34% for BJD and 30% for BJP. This comes within the expected margin of 3% that pollsters generally take into account while generating results. Not to mention that it is BJP which has the momentum and is picking up fringe voters while BJD votes are static since May 2013. Congress is falling to the wayside with each passing day. On the other hand the NDTV-Hansa research poll suggests that things have not changed since 2009 in the state and BJP is still a distant third in the state. So what is the reality? I talked to few of my sources in Odisha and also dig into some stats for Odisha polls and this is what I have been able to come forward with.

The BJP sentiment should not be surprising

The 2009 poll data suggest that BJD is not that strong in Southern Orissa especially is tribal belts where BJP was a force to reckon with. In Sudergarh party candidate Jual Oram (a minister in Vajpayee) government lost by just about 12,000 votes to the Congress candidate. On as many as 12 seats BJP got more than 1,50,000 votes and was a close third on about three to four seats. It is also to be noted that on all these seats Congress was eventual winner and in a way it was a big beneficiary from the BJD-BJP break up in 2009. So the people say that BJP’s rise in Odisha is not sudden. In 2009 the break up with BJD came as a jolt and BJP leaders were not ready to fight on their own (in fact the decision to break away from JD-U in Bihar well ahead of the 2014 was somewhat inspired by this fact). It also lacked credibility as an opposition to BJD, which were its ally weeks prior to the polls. So both parties ended up eating into each other votes and Congress was able to corner all the anti-BJD votes. Now things have changed. BJP has been in the opposition for a full term of five years and the BJP MLAs have been vocal against BJD government also. Again Congress is being perceived as a loser nationally and those who have aligned with it to oppose BJD may not be inclined to do so now. The Modi factor is also working. It is said that the Modi wave is limited in the Hindi-speaking states as Modi is a good orator in Hindi only. Odisha is primarily a non-Hindi state and thus in the rural Orissa his appeal will be limited. If this turns out to be true, it will certainly expose the limitation of Modi’s charisma. So BJP do have a chance to do well in land of Jaggannath as well as land of Somnath.

Yet we may be overestimating BJP’s strength

There is also a group of people who say that in 2009 many BJP candidates were sitting MPs. It had won 7 out of 9 seats allotted to it in 2004 and most of the seats where BJP candidates got vote were seats which have been either been traditionally held by BJP or were carved out from the BJP strongholds during the delimitation exercise. As sitting MPs always have clout in their seats it is not surprising that BJP got votes in those seats. They also point out that BJP failed to cross the one lakh vote marks in key urban areas like Cuttack, Bhubaneshwar, Berhampore and Bhadrak. In all these seats BJD won with huge margin getting more than 4 lakh votes. So even if the Modi factor boosts it in the urban areas it may not be able to get it anywhere close to BJD votes. Congress must also not be too much hopeful from the fact of BJP cutting into BJD votes as BJD had trounced it by more than 1,00,000 votes in as many as 8 seats. A surge in Congress vote is not being seen anywhere in Odisha and thus a spike in BJP votes may just bring down BJD victory margin in these seats. As per my estimates BJD is playing safe in 10 seats including Aska, Berhampore, Puri, Bhubaneshwar, Kendrapara, Cuttack, Kandmahal, Jajpur, Koraput and Dhenkanal. Congress may have a fighting chance in 4 to 6 seats only, if its vote margin does not increase. A 5% decline (which pollsters suggest is taking place) may bring it down to 2 to 3 seats.

So what are the BJP’s chances in Odisha this time

My sources tell me that BJP in serious fight in as many as six seats in Odisha. They are Sundergarh, Mayurbhanj, Bolangir, Kalahandi, Sambhaplur and Balasore. They expect that if JMM is not able to come to Congress’s rescue in the tribal belts of Odisha it may garner 2 to 3 seats from this area. Outside this belt chances of BJP picking any seats are remote as of now. In Bolangir its state president Singhdev is a royal scion and may pull out a surprise if Modi magic works for him. My sources say me that 2 seats for BJP will be a disappointment, 3 to 4 seats will be OK and 5 to 6 seats will be too good. The same parameters for BJD are 8 to 10, 10 to 12 and 12 to 15 respectively. For Congress anything above three seats will be OK. Still given the national mood it may draw a blank in this state too. Most of them say that the gap between BJP and Congress’s vote percentage will be minimal and at least in Lok Sabha it may push Congress to 3^rd place. In assembly election it is expected to come close second to BJP’s third place finish.

What implications can it have for a post-poll scenario in 2014?

The central leadership has always treated Naveen as a potential ally and even in post May 16 scenario, BJD’s kitty of a dozen MPs or so are expected to support BJP to keep Congress out of power. This is the line of thought which stops the BJP leadership (barring Narendra Modi) to go all out against BJD. Put post May 16 if the projected numbers for BJP in Odisha holds true, it may set off an entire new chain of events. If BJP’s vote share crosses 20% mark in the assembly polls and 25% mark in the Lok Sabha polls Naveen’s anti-Congress plank may change. If BJP emerges as a principal opposition of BJD in the state Naveen may find it hard to support BJP in the center. On the other hand if BJP manages to form a government without BJD in Delhi, we may see a sudden exodus of Congress leaders to BJP. This will also not augur well for BJD. So post May 16 Naveen may find himself caught between a rock and a hard place. But if the numbers turn out to be what has been suggested in the Hansa poll, Naveen may be tempted to support BJP. But as my sources have indicated he will prefer a third front government and will support a non-Modi BJP leader only as a last resort. There is no way Naveen can be wooed to back Modi as he will feel it safe in containing himself in Odisha rather than risking the minority vote (about 10%) which may shift directly to Congress if he agrees to support Modi. One of my sources also say that if Congress slips below 15% mark in the state, we may see a tectonic shift in state politics as Congress may go for an alliance with BJD with Congress becoming a junior partner, just like it has been doing in Tamil Nadu and Bihar for several years. Though many, including myself, see this as a far-fetched scenario yet politics in Odisha seems tantalizingly poised for a change. What its shape will can be clear only after May 16. 

Assam- Will it be the last standing fort of the Grand Old Party of India

At a time when the entire country has been obsessed with fascinating rise of a party whose name starts with A and ends with P this piece on Assam will reveal how such kind of mass hysteria in politics can be dangerous for the object as well as subject. When a barely 33-year-old Prafulla Mohanty grabbed power in Assam in 1985 everybody expected him to get rid of years of neglect Assam had faced, but today both Mohanty and his party is facing extinction and year 2014 may witness end of a dream debut of AGP. Well that may be just one of the angles of Assam politics which is very different from the national scene where regional parties are trying to end the hold of national alliances. Another difference with Assam is that while in every other state Congress is fearing its worst ever performance and a single digit tally in Assam it is expected to not only hold its position but also add a bit more glitter to Gogoi’s resolute stand of what may be the last citadel of the Grand Old party of India. Well why it is so let us proceed and explore ….

The peculiar state of affairs in Assam.

Despite having just 14 seats Assam is not a homogenous state. There are numerous tribes and among the Bodo people dominate couple of seats which have remained outside the domain of big political parties in Assam be it AGP, BJP, AUDF or even Congress. To complicate the matter the demographic changes in each and every parliamentary constituency is being eschewed due to migration. When the AGP was formed it had a high acceptance among locals which were agitating primarily against the immigrants coming from northern Indian states and West Bengal. But as time has changed Assam is rapidly becoming a predominantly Muslim state. As the census work in Assam is not simple, no authentic a data is available and by the EC records around 15 lakh voters (out of which 80% are Muslim) are now categorized as Doubtful. Naturally these people, whether a genuine voter or not, are at the mercy of the state government for their continuous stay in the state. This has given Congress a big advantage in lower Assam and Barak Valley which were emerging as crucial support bastions for AGP and BJP in this region. Now each of these 6 constituencies have around 2 lakh voters who are siding with Congress and have no other option (AIUDF including). In the last five years their numbers have swelled by some 30% and many BJP seats in this region are prone to shift to INC due to this factor alone. And there are others too, Let us have a look at them too.

The Hindu Hand

The Hindutva factor may be helping BJP elsewhere in the country but in Assam (as is the case with CPM in Kerala) the Hindu vote is helping Congress. It may seem ironical in the context of what has been written above but it is true. Many Muslims in Assam are voting for Congress only because they fear reprisal from the state government. Given a chance they will vote for Badruddin Ajmal’s AIUDF. It has to be noted that Congress does not have a good Muslim leadership in the state. In 2009 only one Muslim was elected MP on INC ticket. In the last few years with fall in AGP’s graph and rise of AIUDF votes, non-tribal Hindus have been worried. The communal riot that took place in Kokrajhar in 2012 is also further putting fear in the common Hindu populace. Prior to 2014 elections there were lot of talks about an alliance between AIUDF and Congress, but it did not happen. The reasoning behind it is that had this happened, the Hindu vote would have galvanized in the favour of BJP. Now that Congress is fighting alone and because on many seats only Congress can defeat AIUDF, the Hindu vote in those seats will naturally go to it. This factor is working for Congress in at least three Assam seats. In two seats BJP has been able to convince the local Hindus that it can take on AIUDF on its own and thus it is getting support from the Hindus. It has to be noted that in Assam AIUDF is not a pan-State player. It has solid influence in around six seats and can play the spoiler in two other seats. Congress is expected to win Six out of these nine seats. AIUDF may get one and BJP may get one or two.

The AGP-BJP break-up

It is after four Lok Sabha polls (they fought together in 1998, 1999, 2004 and 2009) that AGP and BJP are fighting separately in Assam. But it is not going to be a big factor in Assam. Last time too AGP could win only one out of the six seats allotted to it, while BJP won four out of seven. Given the constant erosion in its support base it could have lost that seat too. BJP had offered it two seats, but AGP refused and thus the alliance could not be continued. Now since majority of top AGP leadership has shifted to BJP, it is not going to hurt it too much. In fact in a couple of seats vacated by AGP like Dibrugarh and Lakhimpur BJP stands a good chance to win. BJP is not hopeful of retaining more than two seats (Gauhati and Silchar) in the state. AGP is now expected to perish completely giving way to emergence of a new political equation in the state, where BJP can hope to play a major role in the days to come.

So what is the final word…

The final seat tally from Assam may look like this. Congress – 7 to 9, BJP – 1 to 3, AIUDF- 1 to 2, BPF -1, Independent – 1

How reliable are Opinion polls?

Just as the first phase of E2014 gets closer a slew of surveys/opinion polls are bound to flood the TV channels.  Just like all the props associated with our democratic system even the Psehphology and Opinion Polls have been on target of several parties in India. The ruling party of India has been so peeved by them that they have boycotted the shows centered around these polls. Yet by keeping our eyes shut we cannot run away the fact. In all large democracies the Opinion Polls are an integral part of the democratic process and by banning them we can only harm their evolution. However at this point of time there are several myths that need to be busted about these polls.

Myth No. 1 ;- These polls are unreliable

Reality :- This may have been a case till a few years ago. 2004 was really a big setback for the industry yet since then it has evolved a lot. In last few years a lot of modification has been made. At least one agency (CSDS) has predicted almost 90% elections rightly and this is high standard for any such polls. It has called right politically tough states like UP on more than one occasion. In fact a lot of credibility associated with AAP (which is also pooh-poohing these polls) is that one of its leaders, Yogendra Yadav, has been one of the pioneers of such kind of fine-tuning of electoral fortunetelling in India and thus people rely on what he says. Just because he has been good at telling at who will win people are now relying on his words on who should win. Nothing more can be a more fitting to reply an allegation against the reliability of the polls. Even other agencies are learning fast and in 2013 Delhi polls when all the big time agencies got their numbers wrong a new agency called Today’s Chanakya got it bang on in its exit poll.

http://www.firstpost.com/politics/aaps-delhi-sweep-the-only-exit-poll-that-got-it-right-1276857.html

So the Delhi elections was not only a big cause of jubilation for AAP but also Today’s Chanakya. Yet it is ironical that while people see AAP’s feat as a miracle they still say that Today’s call was a fluke. Is it not double standard?

Myth 2 :- They can tell us something about Assembly elections but are not that useful in a Lok Sabha poll.

Reality :- Yes the solution has not been so perfect for the national level picture. But 2009 was not a washout like 2004. As early as in January 2009 CSDS gave UPA a seat range of 215-235, in March 2009 Start News gave UPA as many as 257 seats. In reality UPA got 262. In no way it can be said that they can got the picture, yes they got it a bit off the mark still they clearly said that who will win and did not go wrong. Interestingly these agencies faltered a bit more in their exit polls which is generally seen more reliable. CSDS gave UPA 185-205 seats and NDA 165-185 seats, Star News-Nielsen’s number was UPA-199 and NDA-196. So what went wrong? Actually these pollsters did not miss the fact that UPA was ahead and NDA was behind, but they completely missed the big picture for the Third Front and South India. AIADMK and TDP’s numbers were totally skewed and it added a lot of weight to Congress’s numbers. Similar was the case for Left in Bengal and Kerala. In UP too third and fourth front parties like SP and BSP performed much worse than they were expected. So UPA benefitted from decisive mandate against the non-NDA opposition. Since the UPA was frontrunner naturally it benefitted from the swing away from regional parties in several states.  So the agencies will have to fine-tune their strategy a bit more when they are assessing the real strength of regional parties. This time too parties like YSRCP, TMC, TRS, AIADMK are getting a lot of attention. If these numbers go wrong they are going to impact the number of leading coalitions in the big way and may once again strengthen the chorus of opinion polls being unreliable in presenting a national picture.

Myth 3 :- It gives BJP more seats and always underestimates parties like BSP and never capture the true strength of Congress

Reality : -  This was the case in past but in the last few years, after facing flak constantly on this issue, the agencies have changed their methods and in last few years they have been somehow overestimating BSP and Congress. In UP in 2012 everybody gave big numbers to BSP. In Opinion Polls nobody was ready to give it less than 100 seats. In exit poll star news was closest with 83 seats. The INC-RLD combine was given 99 seats by Star News in its opinion polls while in Exit Poll it gave them 51 seats. In reality BSP  got 80 and RLD-Congress got only 37.  The CSDS poll gave BJP just 28-30 seats to BJP in its exit poll whereas it got 50 seats. 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uttar_Pradesh_Legislative_Assembly_election,_2012

In the case of Bihar in 2010 nobody was ready to give BJP more than 60 seats when it got 90+ seats in reality. INC was constantly given more than 20 seats when it got only 4. So the question of overestimating BJP is itself an overstatement.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bihar_Legislative_Assembly_election,_2010

So what is the key flaw?   

One of the major shortcomings of the Opinion Poll business is that it is not adaptable to gauge the impact of a newcomer in political fray. In Andhra it could not predict how PRP’s entry will impact TDP. In Tamil Nadu it could not say how DMDK’s rising graph will benefit DMK. It was almost blind to MNS’s impact in Maharashtra. So a challenge before the industry is to call the multi-cornered contest in right way. This time too AAP has been present in a major part of the country. It will be a bit tricky to predict what will be the final impact of its latent force. Yet you can trust these polls to find out who is ahead. 2004 was an aberration and it is not going to be repeated. For all other things you can keep coming to this blog for getting the better picture of the electoral game.  

How Alliance work at the grass root level :- an insider story

My promised piece of Assam is taking some time as my source in Guwahati is still reconfirming some facts but here I am sharing a real time anecdote that explains how an alliance can suddenly turn into a dalliance and how micromanagement at the ground level can save embarrassment in such a tricky situation. This is about 2010 assembly election in Bihar…

My home constituency Jandaha was dissolved during the delimitation. It was now part of Mahnar constituency Sitting MLAs of both Mahnar and Jandaha were LJP men.  Jandaha was a JD-U seat and Mahnar was a BJP seat. Now after delimitation Mahnar was allocated to BJP. Jandaha MLA (Achutanand Singh) was left in lurch as Mahnar MLA (Rama Singh) was more likely to get nomination from LJP. BJP was also in a dire situation as its local candidate in Mahnar had failed to gain any foothold in the past few elections and a change of candidate was required. So Achutanand shifted side and joined LJP and thus got nominated. On the other side of divide the RJD-LJP alliance was also severally affected. Jandaha was a RJD seat and Mahnar was LJP seat. Since both parties were in alliance this time, RJD conceded Mahnar seat to LJP. Thus RJD candidates of both Jandaha and Mahnar found themselves out of loop. As election days came closer rebellion started brewing on both side of divides. The previous RJD candidate from Jandaha Umesh Singh Kushwaha (now a JD-U leader and a close associate of Upendra Kushwaha) jumped into fray and threatened to take away Kurmi-Koeri vote from the official NDA nominee. Repeated plea to JD-U leaders failed to clear this hurdle. The talking heads of BJP went into huddle. The old RJD candidate Mushi Lal Rai (a respected but aged Yadav leader) was persuaded to file his nomination from Mahnar. Now the ruptures appeared in the RJD-LJP alliance too as RJD supporters refused to back Rama Singh (a local Rajput strongman). Now the stakes were even. The BJP candidate was solidly backed by upper caste votes (barring a section of Rajput votes behind the LJP candidate) and core BJP voters, LJP candidate was banking on his caste based support and Paswan votes, JD-U rebel had good going with the traditional JD-U voters and rebel RJD candidate had Yadavs backing him solidly. Muslim vote was divided among all non-BJP candidates. All alliances were present on paper but on ground none were working. Now what was the final outcome? Hold your breath because this is going to give you a ringside view of what is going to happen in many constituencies in Bihar in 2014. The BJP candidate won with a tiny amount of votes 29754 votes out of total 118972 valid votes. The LJP candidate got 27265 votes. The winning margin was 2489 votes. And what the rebels got is truly awesome. The RJD rebel got 20757 votes while the JD-U rebel got 18322 votes. Had it not been the micromanagement done by local BJP unit, LJP would have carried the day hands down. Yet we all thought that 2010 Bihar assembly election was won by a solid NDA alliance and development plank of the Nitish administration. I was in Delhi when results were announced and all the TV channels were interpreting the results in their own way. But having the ground level experience I was only smiling at their wisdom. This story is not an isolated event. It took place in several dozen constituencies and in some way the swiftness of break-up in BJP-JD (U) alliance and RJD-LJP alliance traces their origin from several such tales. Alliances may be switched up by the top leadership yet unless the local units gel together they are more liability than an asset and I can sense a similar kind of uneasiness in RJD-Congress alliance where the traditional RJD voters are not ready to vote for INC. RVP has learnt his lessons, RaGa is expected to learn it in hard way post May 16, 2014. 

Alliances that work and those who do not? A ringside view

My promised piece of Assam is taking some time as my source in Guwahati is still reconfirming some facts but here I am sharing a real time anecdote that explains how an alliance can suddenly turn into a dalliance and how micromanagement at the ground level can save embarrassment in such a tricky situation. This is about 2010 assembly election in Bihar…

My home constituency Jandaha was dissolved during the delimitation. It was now part of Mahnar constituency Sitting MLAs of both Mahnar and Jandaha were LJP men.  Jandaha was a JD-U seat and Mahnar was a BJP seat. Now after delimitation Mahnar was allocated to BJP. Jandaha MLA (Achutanand Singh) was left in lurch as Mahnar MLA (Rama Singh) was more likely to get nomination from LJP. BJP was also in a dire situation as its local candidate in Mahnar had failed to gain any foothold in the past few elections and a change of candidate was required. So Achutanand shifted side and joined LJP and thus got nominated. On the other side of divide the RJD-LJP alliance was also severally affected. Jandaha was a RJD seat and Mahnar was LJP seat. Since both parties were in alliance this time, RJD conceded Mahnar seat to LJP. Thus RJD candidates of both Jandaha and Mahnar found themselves out of loop. As election days came closer rebellion started brewing on both side of divides. The previous RJD candidate from Jandaha Umesh Singh Kushwaha (now a JD-U leader and a close associate of Upendra Kushwaha) jumped into fray and threatened to take away Kurmi-Koeri vote from the official NDA nominee. Repeated plea to JD-U leaders failed to clear this hurdle. The talking heads of BJP went into huddle. The old RJD candidate Mushi Lal Rai (a respected but aged Yadav leader) was persuaded to file his nomination from Mahnar. Now the ruptures appeared in the RJD-LJP alliance too as RJD supporters refused to back Rama Singh (a local Rajput strongman). Now the stakes were even. The BJP candidate was solidly backed by upper caste votes (barring a section of Rajput votes behind the LJP candidate) and core BJP voters, LJP candidate was banking on his caste based support and Paswan votes, JD-U rebel had good going with the traditional JD-U voters and rebel RJD candidate had Yadavs backing him solidly. Muslim vote was divided among all non-BJP candidates. All alliances were present on paper but on ground none were working. Now what was the final outcome? Hold your breath because this is going to give you a ringside view of what is going to happen in many constituencies in Bihar in 2014. The BJP candidate won with a tiny amount of votes 29754 votes out of total 118972 valid votes. The LJP candidate got 27265 votes. The winning margin was 2489 votes. And what the rebels got is truly awesome. The RJD rebel got 20757 votes while the JD-U rebel got 18322 votes. Had it not been the micromanagement done by local BJP unit, LJP would have carried the day hands down. Yet we all thought that 2010 Bihar assembly election was won by a solid NDA alliance and development plank of the Nitish administration. I was in Delhi when results were announced and all the TV channels were interpreting the results in their own way. But having the ground level experience I was only smiling at their wisdom. This story is not an isolated event. It took place in several dozen constituencies and in some way the swiftness of break-up in BJP-JD (U) alliance and RJD-LJP alliance traces their origin from several such tales. Alliances may be switched up by the top leadership yet unless the local units gel together they are more liability than an asset and I can sense a similar kind of uneasiness in RJD-Congress alliance where the traditional RJD voters are not ready to vote for INC. RVP has learnt his lessons, RaGa is expected to learn it in hard way post May 16, 2014.