My promised piece of Assam is
taking some time as my source in Guwahati is still reconfirming some facts but
here I am sharing a real time anecdote that explains how an alliance can suddenly
turn into a dalliance and how micromanagement at the ground level can save embarrassment
in such a tricky situation. This is about 2010 assembly election in Bihar…
My home constituency Jandaha was
dissolved during the delimitation. It was now part of Mahnar constituency
Sitting MLAs of both Mahnar and Jandaha were LJP men. Jandaha was a JD-U seat and Mahnar was a BJP
seat. Now after delimitation Mahnar was allocated to BJP. Jandaha MLA
(Achutanand Singh) was left in lurch as Mahnar MLA (Rama Singh) was more likely
to get nomination from LJP. BJP was also in a dire situation as its local candidate
in Mahnar had failed to gain any foothold in the past few elections and a change
of candidate was required. So Achutanand shifted side and joined LJP and thus
got nominated. On the other side of divide the RJD-LJP alliance was also severally
affected. Jandaha was a RJD seat and Mahnar was LJP seat. Since both parties
were in alliance this time, RJD conceded Mahnar seat to LJP. Thus RJD candidates
of both Jandaha and Mahnar found themselves out of loop. As election days came
closer rebellion started brewing on both side of divides. The previous RJD
candidate from Jandaha Umesh Singh Kushwaha (now a JD-U leader and a close
associate of Upendra Kushwaha) jumped into fray and threatened to take away Kurmi-Koeri
vote from the official NDA nominee. Repeated plea to JD-U leaders failed to clear
this hurdle. The talking heads of BJP went into huddle. The old RJD candidate
Mushi Lal Rai (a respected but aged Yadav leader) was persuaded to file his
nomination from Mahnar. Now the ruptures appeared in the RJD-LJP alliance too
as RJD supporters refused to back Rama Singh (a local Rajput strongman). Now
the stakes were even. The BJP candidate was solidly backed by upper caste votes
(barring a section of Rajput votes behind the LJP candidate) and core BJP
voters, LJP candidate was banking on his caste based support and Paswan votes,
JD-U rebel had good going with the traditional JD-U voters and rebel RJD
candidate had Yadavs backing him solidly. Muslim vote was divided among all
non-BJP candidates. All alliances were present on paper but on ground none were
working. Now what was the final outcome? Hold your breath because this is going
to give you a ringside view of what is going to happen in many constituencies in
Bihar in 2014. The BJP candidate won with a tiny amount of votes 29754 votes
out of total 118972 valid votes. The LJP candidate got 27265 votes. The winning
margin was 2489 votes. And what the rebels got is truly awesome. The RJD rebel
got 20757 votes while the JD-U rebel got 18322 votes. Had it not been the
micromanagement done by local BJP unit, LJP would have carried the day hands
down. Yet we all thought that 2010 Bihar assembly election was won by a solid
NDA alliance and development plank of the Nitish administration. I was in Delhi
when results were announced and all the TV channels were interpreting the results
in their own way. But having the ground level experience I was only smiling at
their wisdom. This story is not an isolated event. It took place in several
dozen constituencies and in some way the swiftness of break-up in BJP-JD (U)
alliance and RJD-LJP alliance traces their origin from several such tales. Alliances
may be switched up by the top leadership yet unless the local units gel
together they are more liability than an asset and I can sense a similar kind
of uneasiness in RJD-Congress alliance where the traditional RJD voters are not
ready to vote for INC. RVP has learnt his lessons, RaGa is expected to learn it
in hard way post May 16, 2014.
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